1 Among the major contributions to this debate one can list Nagel (1970, 90-8; 1986, 164-88) , Darwall (1983, 117-67) , Parfit (1984, 142-3) , Pettit (1987) , McNaughton and Rawling (1991; 1995) , Korsgaard (1996a, 275-310; 1996b, 132-45; 2009, 191-206) , O'Day (1998) , Norman (2000) , Le Bar (2001) , Gert (2002) , Willigenburg (2002) , and Wallace (2009). In this paper I intend to take a stance in the debate concerning the private or public quality of practical reasons by arguing that -far from amounting to statements of personal concerns -practical reasons are inherently public, or constitutively shared, standards. Accordingly, an agent's reasons are not concerns that only the agent takes as grounded, whereas other individuals may legitimately fail to recognise them. Insofar as one has a reason for action, that action is supported by a statement that others cannot refrain from treating as a sound basis for action without misunderstanding the predicament at stake. The view I defend here is, therefore, that one's practical reasons are essentially public considerations in a specific sense, namely, they ought to be recognised as valuable justifications for action not only by the agent but by anyone else, including those who may have different, or even conflicting, interests. Related, idiosyncratic preferences, private motives, personal interests and the like cannot be regarded as practical reasons, since, no consideration can be qualified as a practical reason unless it is intersubjectively acknowledgeable as a meaningful supporting ground of action and so it makes normative claims a generality of subjects, as opposed to just the agent, will have to regard as (at least presumptively and defeasibly) valid.
As I will illustrate in some detail, the sense of publicity of practical reasons I argue for in this paper occupies a middle ground between the two fundamental meanings of publicity of reasons defended in the literature. For one thing, the thesis I champion in this work is stronger than the claim that practical reasons are public insofar as they are intelligible by anyone thinking clearly; for another, my view is weaker than the claim, supported by the most radical advocates of the thesis of the public quality of reasons, that practical reasons are necessarily shared by those directly or indirectly concerned by them. In order to systematically argue for my variant of the public character of practical reasonsa variant that I acknowledge to be potentially controversial as it can be attacked not only by those who defend the inherently private quality of reasons but also by those who theorise different senses of the publicity of reasons -I will have first to introduce the fundamentals of the debate concerned with whether practical reasons are by nature public standards or, instead, they are statements that merely summarise private and personal concerns. In my introductory engagement with the current debate, which is carried out in Section 2, I will embark in more than a mapping exercise: far from merely describing, or simply acknowledged as being indirectly authoritative by more than just one individual, to be sure; but this is merely a contingent possibility and so may or may not occur.
The basic idea underlying the privacy thesis can also be expressed by saying that the notion of a reason has a built-in subjective dimension: where there is a reason for a subject to act in a given way, others are not necessarily justified, or even bound, to take that reason into account and shape their conduct accordingly. Since practical reasons are essentially subject-related, no one is obligated to consider the reasons of others when deciding what they ought to do.
To use a figurative language, the privacy thesis defines the domain delimited by practical reasons as one's own "backyard", or a fenced-off area, which is possibly owned and inhabited by a single agent, as opposed to a shared space that, like a town square, is occupied, or at least can be occupied, by a potentially indeterminate number of individuals all of whom share and recognise the same reasons.
The privacy thesis can be considered the dominant view today.
3 Among philosophers it is largely believed that practical reasons are not essentially shared. Whilst it is certainly acknowledged that there may be cases and circumstances in which a consideration justifying the performance of a certain action on the part of a specific agent will also be regarded as justifying some undertaking by other subjects, this is not a necessity -as one does not have to concede that the reasons given by others provide normative power for one's own action -but rather a mere possibility -as one may concede that sometimes the reasons of others have normative power for one's action too. 4 The upshot of this approach is that there is no conceptual obstacle -no obstacle, that is, inscribed into the concept of a practical reason -to taking a certain standard as providing adequate ground for an agent's acting in a certain way while regarding it as failing to perform a normative function in relation to other individuals.
From the conceptual point of view, in other words, there is nothing amiss in a scenario in which (a) an agent motivates or justifies her action by appealing to considerations she personally deems as valuable and yet (b) those considerations 3 See, for instance, Sturgeon (1974) , Williams (1981) , Parfit (1984, 142-4) , Mack (1989; ), Dreier (1996 ), Le Bar (2001 ) and Gert (2002 . An original position, which I tend to classify as a defence of the privacy thesis is theorised in Hage (forthcoming, "Facts and Meaning"; especially when read in combination with: Hage, forthcoming, "The Justification of Value Judgement"). 4 For a defence of these claims see, amongst others, Gert (2002) .
are seen by other subjects as unmotivated or unjustified, namely, they are regarded as having no intersubjective or interpersonal value. From this view, then, an agent is perfectly entitled to prioritise her personal projects, even idiosyncratic ones, over projects whose value is generally acknowledged, whilst at the same time not being viewed as acting for no reason at all, or contrary to the demands of practical reasons. 5 This means that no agent has an obligation to recognise the reasons of others, since those reasons have to be held as purely personal, or even possibly idiosyncratic, and so not essentially shareable by (or even not inherently communicable to) other agents. In sum, those who support the privacy thesis treat practical reasons as agent-relative considerations: that is, considerations that do not necessarily extend their normative effects beyond the agent to which they primarily and directly apply.
The Publicity Thesis
The objection to these claims is that they are based on a fundamental mistake about the nature of a practical reason. The picture of a practical reason as an inherently personal, or private, standard, it is counter argued, rests on a misunderstanding of what a practical reason is. Far from reflecting personal concerns practical reasons are essentially public standards: their normative significance necessarily extends beyond the agent who has them or is primarily concerned with them -I will call this the thesis of the publicity of reasons, or publicity thesis for short. A practical reason, for those who embrace the publicity thesis, is at least partly indifferent to the distinction between agents and so a consideration supporting the relevant conduct that produces effects not only on a specific agent but also on any other subject. Reasons, in other words, are in their essence agent-neutral, or impersonal, and so should be constructed as constitutively relational and interpersonal. Accordingly, a practical reason should be characterised as an essentially shared standard that directly governs and, in certain cases, makes obligatory not only an action of the agent who has originally deliberated about it, but also related actions of different individuals. On this view, 5 And in fact, at least in a possible version of the privacy thesis -defended, for instance, in Williams (1981) -we deny the privacy of (certain) reasons only at the cost of depriving agents of their specificity and individuality. For, unless we allow for the possibility that an individual's action is guided by her own distinctively personal projects and commitments -projects and commitments that are not of necessity shared by others -we end up denying the very individuality of an agent by not granting her sufficient freedom to design her own life.
thus, practical reasons are sources of justifications that potentially apply to courses of conduct carried out by any agent.
To rephrase the idea, the main insight underpinning the publicity thesis is that, unless a certain consideration supports a given conduct from the point of view of any agent, it is not a genuine practical reason, namely, it should not be taken to be a reason proper and should be regarded instead as being a bogus reason. This is to say, being public is a defining trait of a practical reason and so an essential condition for something to count as a reason (in the true sense). As one critic of the publicity thesis puts it, for those who accept the thesis it is not possible to "make just anything a reason simply by calling it a reason", since "there needs to be some criterion to distinguish between correct and incorrect applications of [the concept of a reason]" (LeBar 2001, 263) . Accordingly, some kinds of considerations -precisely, the considerations whose normative effect is confined to the agent who has them -are constitutively excluded from the qualification of "practical reasons"; they are rather to be qualified as "counterfeit practical reasons", or statements that provide seemingly practical support.
Related, the public quality makes a practical reason discontinuous with, and irreducible to, a personal state a particular agent may have. Whilst the latter is essentially private and so can in principle back the action performed by one agent only, without having to be regarded as authoritative by others, a practical reason has a built-in intersubjective element and so its force is to be conceded by any agent who encounters it. This means that it is a conceptual impossibility for a reason to have, say, an obligatory force in relation to one agent while having no force in relation to other agents.
6
The thesis that a practical reason is, by its very nature, a consideration that can be publicly assessed and has force anyone thinking clearly is bound to recognise has, in turn, been interpreted in three distinct ways. In the most basic, This way, a reason is claimed to be completely independent of an agent's perspective: publicity is taken to be the equivalent of impersonality, or perspectivelessness. This interpretation of the publicity thesis is conceptually associated with the possibility of establishing the existence of objective values as well as attributing some objective value to the courses of conduct favoured by a practical reason. As long as the action one has a reason to perform can be regarded as having objective value, such an action is one that anyone will acknowledge to have to be performed. Accordingly, it is not the case that just one particular agent has reasons to carry out such a course of conduct. Being objectively good the relevant action should be carried out and, accordingly, its performance is something every agent ought to contribute to. An agent's reasons for action are, as a result, not just her own reasons but rather the reasons on which everyone else is legitimately expected to act, since they indicate ends, goals and purposes that every subject will have to regard as valuable and so recognise as worthy of being pursued.
A somewhat intermediate position between these two versions of the publicity thesis is defended in Christine Korsgaard 's work (1996a; 1996b; 2009 Publicity is thus associated to some interpersonal normative force: the normative force of a reason, qua a public standard, supervenes on the relationships of agents interacting one with another. This requires, in a nutshell, the reinterpretation of the idea of publicity as a kind of interpersonal authoritativeness, intersubjectivity, or singular-perspective neutrality.
My Claim Introduced and Defended
In this section I intend to champion (a variant of) the publicity thesis. With a view of doing so, I will first clarify in detail what the publicity thesis means to me -namely, how I suggest that it should be interpreted to be of greatest theoretical interest. I will then put forward an argument in its support. In this context, I
should preliminary introduce two important caveats, which concern my 9 The reference to Wittgenstein's private language argument can be found in Korsgaard (1996b, 136-45) , whereas the notion of a "private reasoner" is introduced in Korsgaard (2009, 193-202) . 10 On this notion see also Willigenburg (2002) .
reinterpretation of the controversy surrounding the private quality versus the public quality of practical reasons.
First, I reinterpret the claims made by the supporters of the privacy thesis and the advocates of the publicity thesis as claims referring to a substantive dimension of practical reasons -their force -as opposed to their formal, or syntactical, dimension. This makes my reconstruction of the divide between private reasons and public reasons somehow different from the understanding of that divide held by most participants of the debate. The opposition around which the debate has developed was originally framed by Thomas Nagel in terms of the form a practical reason takes. In Nagel's framework, a reason has to be regarded as essentially private -or, to use Nagel's (1970, 91) own terms, "subjective" -as long as it necessarily contains a "free-agent variable" in its formulation; a reason is to be conceived, instead, as essentially public -or "objective" in Nagel's terminology -as long as no "free-agent variable" appears of necessity in its statement. Accordingly, Nagel's opposition primarily concerns the syntax of practical reasons, that is, their formulation. 11 By contrast, here I reinterpret the debate between those who defend the privacy thesis and those who argue for the publicity thesis as a debate concerning the normative significance a practical reason constitutively has. I am interested, in other words, in whether or not the normative force a reason inherently has extends beyond the agent it directly applies to. Thus, the privacy thesis and publicity thesis are reinterpreted here as claims concerned not with the formulation, or syntactical appearance, of a practical reason, but rather with its authority and sphere of application.
Therefore, the question addressed in this section is not: "should or should we not state a practical reason in a form that makes reference to the subject who directly acts on it?" Instead, the question is: "does a practical reason produce normative effects on other subjects besides the individual who directly acts on it?" Answering this question forces us to go beyond mere syntactical considerations and embark on a substantive treatment, the character of which is both semantic and pragmatic, of the notion of a practical reason.
11 A number of different theorists, including Nagel (1986, 164-88) , Pettit (1987) and McNaughton and Rawling (1991; 1995) among others, have followed this tendency by focusing exclusively on the formal dimension of the distinction between private reasons and public reasons. A different concern, more in line with (albeit not exactly the same as) the one I am interested in, characterises other works, for example, Darwall (1983, 117-67) , Korsgaard (1996a, 275-310; 1996b, 132-45; 2009, 191-206) , Willigenburg (2002) , and Wallace (2009 Raz (2008, 184) frames the idea, it "gives a point or a purpose to one's action", which accordingly "is undertaken for the sake of or in pursuit of that point or purpose". However, this is not just any point or purpose but one understood to have inherent value, and it is in this sense that a justificatory reason also carries evaluative meaning. The point -that is, the reason itself, or the ground for why we (ought to) behave as indicated -is understood to be right, proper, appropriate, or otherwise reasonable. So, even though the entire proposition may be open to criticism, it still carries with it a value judgment introducing that behaviour as right, proper, appropriate, or otherwise reasonable. A justificatory reason does so by offering a standard of evaluation and correctness, that is, a criterion in light of which we can judge a course of action as having those qualities (its being right, proper, appropriate, reasonable, and so on) and by virtue of which that course of action can be grounded, or rationalised, that is,
shown to be the correct thing to do. This is to say that the argument I will offer in the rest of the essay is intended to show that practical reasons are public 12 The three classes just mentioned are often reduced to two in the literature: there are (a) reasons that justify, referred to as justificatory, justifying, prescriptive, normative, or grounding reasons; and (b) reasons that explain, referred to as motivating or explanatory reasons. We can see this, for instance, in Dancy (2000b, 1-25) . However, Alvarez (2010, (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) has compellingly argued that this twofold distinction arbitrarily conflates reasons that motivate with reasons that explain: this distinction is arbitrary because, as much as a motivating reason may go some way toward explaining someone's behaviour, it is but one ingredient in such an explanation, and so cannot be the explanation itself. True, the intent in either case is non-normative, but we should not thereby conclude that to show what motivates one to action is what explains that action, and motivating reasons, accordingly, ought to be kept distinct from explanatory reasons. This enriched threefold taxonomy of actions can also be found in Hieronymi (2011, (409) (410) (411) (412) (413) (414) . For an introduction to the various kinds of practical reasons, see Lenman (2010) .
standards of justifications and thus publicity is a character that should be attributed to practical reasons in their justificatory function. A conceptual link can therefore be claimed to exist between the publicity of reasons and their interpersonal justificatory tenor. This means that a necessary connection arises between practical reasons, on the one hand, and intersubjective justification and legitimate criticism, on the other.
Importantly, the focus on the justificatory dimension of practical reasons contributes to markedly distinguish the version of the publicity thesis defended
here from other views of that thesis, which apply the distinction between private reasons and public reasons to both the motivating force and the justificatory force of a practical reason. 13 In fact, the debate has largely been concerned with whether (a) a practical reason is an inherently personal consideration that in principle motivates only a specific agent to perform certain actions as well as justifies her to do so without necessarily playing the same motivating and justificatory role in relation to other individuals, or, conversely, whether (b) a practical reason is a consideration that is essentially shared, to the effect that it performs a motivating and justificatory function in relation to more than just one individual (the agent). By contrast, here I am interested in discussing whether or not a consideration, qua reason, essentially plays a justificatory role that anyone, as opposed to a single individual, is bound to acknowledge. The focus of the present discussion will, as a result, be more limited and confined when compared to the scope of the current debate on the publicity thesis.
Building on these premises, my understanding of the publicity thesis is loosely related to the interpretation of publicity as standing for shareability. Like those who frame publicity in terms of shareability, such as Korsgaard, I think that reasons are essentially public standards in a sense that is more demanding than, and thus goes beyond, mere intelligibility -a reason for action can be qualified as public only if it is more than merely understandable to others, to whom it can simply be conveyed in a meaningful way. 14 The publicity of a reason certainly 13 Korsgaard's (1996a) treatment is paradigmatic in this sense. 14 In that respect, my version of the publicity thesis can be located in the same ballpark as Korsgaard's. My variant, however, deviates from the one Korsgaard sets out to defend at least in one respect: it is only concerned with the justificatory dimension of practical reasons (by contrast, Korsgaard's claims concern the publicity of both motivating reasons and justificatory reasons). The focus of my approach to the question at stake, thus, is narrow(er than Korsgaard's). Which also means that the argument I offer in support of the publicity thesis cannot be used without significant adjustments and modifications to vindicate the conclusions about the public quality of practical reasons Korsgaard is committed to defend. circumstances an agent experiences it would be unreasonable to expect the publicity thesis to mean that a consideration, in order for it to be a reason, essentially requires every agent to perform the action it justifies. That is to say, the insight incorporated in the publicity thesis cannot, on pain of turning it into a patently untenable claim, be understood as referring to the fact that a reason, qua public standard, necessarily exacts the same performance from everyone.
The publicity thesis should be interpreted, instead, as committing one to acknowledge the fact that a practical reason cannot hold for just one agent and, at the same time, be regarded as an arbitrary and non-shareable personal preference by (some) others. Namely, what the publicity thesis requires is that a practical reason does not have an impact on the normative position of just one agent while leaving (some) others unaffected or indifferent. Thus, conceding that other subjects may not have a reason to perform the conduct we have practical reasons to value cannot be seen as recanting the publicity thesis, provided that it is simultaneously acknowledged that those subjects also have to recognise the significance of the relevant conduct for us and so must regard our reasons as considerations any agent in our position would appeal to legitimately support the action we perform when acting upon those reasons. 16 Publicity, in sum, should be taken to mean interpersonal normative significance, namely, to refer to the capacity of a consideration to count, although in different ways, for potentially any individual coming in contact with it and so to have justificatory influence across different agents. 17 To put it succinctly, the normative force of a reason is public insofar as it conceptually transfers from agent to agent.
The second dimension of the publicity thesis, in the version I endorse, can be thus formulated: such thesis implies that practical reasons inherently command In the first scenario, on return from a business trip an old friend of mine, now a committed and workaholic broker, who has not taken a single break from work in the last ten years, meets me at the airport of Frankfurt, where I am waiting for a flight to Naples. Asked why I am heading for Naples, I reply that I have booked a ten-day holiday on the nearby Amalfi coast, where I am expected to enjoy sunny weather and delicious food -the trademarks of that region. In the second scenario, the broker and I meet (again) at the Frankfurt airport, but this time when asked why I am traveling to Naples I reply that I am doing so, since I only intend to buy a cask of ordinary German lager there -a brand of German lager that, as a matter of fact, is ordinarily available at the same price and in the same packaging at any local supermarket of the town I live in. My workaholic friend finds both "flying to Naples in order to take some holidays" (scenario 1) and "flying to Naples in order to buy a cask of lager available at any local supermarket" (scenario 2) less than commendable pieces of conduct. Yet, he (as well as anyone else finding both my journeys criticisable) categorise, and react to, the two practical options differently. Let me elaborate.
In the first scenario, the broker disapproves of my decision -taking a holiday -whilst seeing the value (merely defeasible as it is) of that decision. If one considers taking a break from work, a stay on the Amalfi Coast is a sensible option, among countless others: everyone -even a workaholic -sees the rationale for my flying to Naples. On this basis, I can be claimed to have a reason for travelling to Naples. The justification supporting my journey is not one anybody will be prepared to uphold, to be sure. Indeed, a workaholic is perfectly entitled to think that I am wasting my time on something -holidays -that is not only unnecessary for my wellbeing -my workaholic friend has never been on holidays in the last decade and yet he is in a good shape -but also financially costly for both myself and the institution I work in -which has to do without my professional performance for ten days. On this ground, one's view may well be that the justification I provide in scenario 1 is weak and inconclusive by thus failing to vindicate my conduct all things considered. Despite all this, (even) a workaholic is expected not only to take the statement I gave in support of my (criticisable) choice as intelligible but also to recognise that statement as a potentially reasonable ground for flying to Naples. In other terms, my justification for travelling to Naples (a) is understandable (intelligibility of the ground I offer) and (b) makes perfect sense as a line of conduct one may find attractive (recognisability of the ground I offer). Now, contrast all this with the way we (including the broker in the example given) can legitimately be expected to approach the second scenario. Anyone thinking clearly is likely to be puzzled by my reply to the broker in our second meeting at the airport. The sources of puzzlements do not reside in the fact that the statement I provide in support of my decision to fly to Naples is a consideration someone with different priorities and values would not be willing to act on (as it was the case in the first scenario). It should be located instead in the fact that buying a cask of lager ordinarily available next door does not count as a possible justification for flying to Naples. Accordingly, in the second scenario, one is (entitled to be) not only in disagreement with the agent but also puzzled by the conduct carried out. For, taken at its face value, my reply is not merely an arguably criticisable justification; it rather falls short of a justification altogether.
Despite our best effort, we fail to see the grounds of someone's decision to travel so far away only to purchase something ordinary that is available at a local supermarket. It is not, in the second scenario, that an individual with different life plans and practical objectives disagree with me over the benefits of flying to Naples and taking a break from work, namely, on the reasons supporting my act;
rather, on this occasion, without any fault on his part, the broker (and indeed anyone else too) is unable to recognise the ground I offer in support to my flying to Naples as a kind of justification -be it weak or strong. This is so, because in the second scenario, I do not give any reason that can be constructed as a To generalise the case, in the first scenario I supply a statement in support of my move, which is public, namely, it is transparent to others who are thus able to both understand the grounds for action and recognise it as valuable (if only presumptively so). By contrast, in the second scenario the backing I offer is an expression of a merely private statement nobody else can appreciate and value as a ground for the conduct I perform. In this context, the comparative analysis of the two fictional scenarios introduced above serves to illustrate the role played by the public quality of a statement offered in support to one's performance. In such quality -publicity -resides the conceptual difference between a practical reason and a non-practical-reason-like statement supporting one's piece of conduct. Practical reasons do not (necessarily) provide sound and conclusive justifications for action, as the legitimate disagreement between me and the broker in scenario 1 attests. In fact, the possibility is always there that practical reasons are regarded by others as partial, or even weak, justification: they may well (turn out to) be statements that secure conclusive justifications for one's piece of conduct. Yet, practical reasons are conceptually different from nonpractical-reason-like statements, since the former, even when they are weak or partial justifications, retain a public quality -public in the sense discussed above idiosyncratic, and so are intrinsically not shareable by others. To put it the other way round, whenever we are confronted with grounds for action expressing just a private concern we are not in the presence of a practical reason -not even a practical reason that can legitimately be considered weak or criticisable. Contrary to what the defendants of the privacy thesis claim, no such ground amounts to a practical reason, which by its constitution is a justification that is both intelligible to and susceptible of being appreciated (even if not necessarily upheld) by others -and in this sense is inherently public.
The preceding remarks should suffice to clarify the scope of my version of the publicity thesis. In the variant of the thesis I embrace it is conceptually true that whenever there is a reason X for an agent to act in some way other subjects cannot fail to acknowledge X as a valuable consideration that contributes to, not necessarily in a decisive way, determine the resulting conduct both that agent and everyone else concerned ought to undertake. It is essential, however, not to read too much in the publicity thesis. seek to achieve. My claim is rather that if you have a reason for acting in some fashion then I will have to take that reason into account when deliberating about my conduct or assessing the merits of yours, since that reason works (not just for you but) for me (and others) too as a presumptively intelligible and valuable consideration that justifies (at least prima facie) the course of conduct. At the same time, the version of the publicity thesis I set out to argue for in this paper is not trivially true -a stance even those who conceive of practical reason as private in quality would be ready to endorse. The variant of the publicity thesis defended here is indeed incompatible with the claim that one can legitimately be indifferent to another's reasons, to the effect that others are justified to pay no attention to the reasons supporting one behaviour and hence to treat those reasons are merely private considerations no one apart from the agent ought to be concerned with -which is the core of the privacy thesis. That my version of the publicity thesis is non-trivially true and can be set conceptually apart from the privacy thesis is attested by the fact that if an agent has a reason for acting in some way then everyone else is under the constraint to acknowledge the valuemerely presumptive and limited in scope as it may (be regarded to) be -of the piece of conduct supported by the relevant reason. A reason, in that sense, differs in kind from a private concern that everyone apart from the agent can simply ignore, just neglect or thoughtlessly shrug off when reflecting about conduct. This characterisation configures practical reasons as public statements in the (limited and yet non-trivial) sense that anything we qualify as a practical reason occupies a shared space, namely, a space we all inhabit, we all ought to take care of and we all are responsible for. This conclusion is incompatible with the conception of practical reasons as private considerations -conception that is conceptually associated with the privacy thesis. Hence, the non-triviality of my In Wittgenstein's philosophy, as they correctly notice, the concept of a normative standard differs from that of an empirical generalisation. Accordingly, the content of a normative standard does not coincide with the content most people think it 18 These claims are mainly made in Wittgenstein (1968, § § 185-242) . 19 See in particular Baker and Hacker (1984, 1-55; 1985, 154-181) . The sceptical view originates from the reading of Wittgenstein's rule following considerations put forward in Kripke (1982) . The question that Kripke addressed was what makes the rules work, and the ensuing debate drew many philosophers. The essential contributions are from Blackburn (1984) , McDowell (1984) , McGinn (1984, 72-7 and 168-75) , Peacocke (1984) , Wright (1984) , Anscombe (1985) and Malcolm (1986, 154-81; . 20 See Baker and Hacker (1984, 18-21; 1985, 171-3) .
has: the most widespread opinion among the members of a group is not the final court of appeal when it comes to determining the content of a normative standard they apply, nor can their general conduct be held up as the ultimate criterion for the correct use of the normative standard.
Baker's and Hacker's critique of the sceptical reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on normative standards -a critique based on the suggestion, which I take to be correct, that a normative standard is not entirely determined by its social use -should not, however, lead one to overlook the social structure of under which a normative expression is regularly employed -that is, a shared, or "public," use. 22 Therefore, for Wittgenstein a normative standard and the mode of using it relate to a common practice and so to a wider context than that of the single act by which appealing to a normative standard takes place. Thus, as long as a normative standard maintains a connection with the idea of use, our referring to a normative standard is not only a practice; it is also, and prominently, a public or shared practice. 21 The direct connection between a normative standard and its use is pointed out in Wittgenstein's (1968, § 190) remark that "the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it" is the criterion for the way a normative standard is meant. See also Wittgenstein (1968, § 43) . 22 This aspect of Wittgenstein's notion of "use" is apparent in Wittgenstein (1968, § § 49, 199, 206, 240-2; 1978, 334 as it "presupposes a context of structure, and that is provided by the actual harmonious interactions of a group of people … that is, the dynamic interactions of a group of people in sustaining certain regularities, customs and patters of actions over time" (Williams 1999, 169) . Normative standards, hence, are inescapably embedded in the social fabric: it is the existence of a social practice that provides the necessary framework within which they can be understood and used to guide and justify conduct. Accordingly, on the one hand, normative standards can exist only against the background of a group and a shared, or public, practice; on the other hand, the social and regular use of a normative standard is the necessary context without which the normative standard could not emerge. There is no such thing, in a nutshell, as a normative standard, or any acting on a normative standard, occurring outside a public context. The community, and nothing else, "provides the logical space for an array of alternatives" to which a normative standard can be said to apply. 24 An individual alone "hasn't the resources for creating the context within which actions can be correct or incorrect" (Williams 1999, 187) . In sum, Wittgenstein's remarks legitimise us to conclude that the existence of a normative standard is connected to the regular and public use of a sign and that it makes no sense to conceive of normative standards as considerations existing outside social settings.
This does not entail the claim that a normative standard is what the majority of people think it is, as the community view argues. A community of agents is the context out of which normative standards can be said to exist; it is not, however, the ultimate measure by which to determine the content of a normative standard, because public use is not the only factor involved in fixing the meaning of a normative standard. As Williams (1999, pp. 176-7 ; original emphasis) puts it, "we have standards only in virtue of group harmony and against the background 23 See, in particular, Williams (1999, 157-187) . 24 Williams (1999, p. 173) . A caveat may be in order here. On this view, there is nothing to prevent isolated individuals from applying a standard, as well as creating new standards: they can do so in virtue of their notional membership of a given community. In other words, living outside society is not a problem so long as the individuals so situated maintain at least an indirect link with this social structure -in the sense that they continue to follow the patterns and the practices learnt and assimilated when they lived in this society.
of group harmony, but the standards themselves do not refer to, nor are described in terms of, group harmony". From this view, the community as a whole, namely, the majority of users, has no privileged access to the content of a normative standard. Thus, the bulk of people are just as likely as the single person to misuse a normative standard: there is no such thing as a public or community check on the correct way to go about obeying a normative standard.
It may even happen that the entire community is following a normative standard erroneously. This way, the thesis that a practical reason, qua normative standard, has a social nature does not preclude the possibility of a large-scale or even global error in applying normative standards Importantly, this reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on normativity entails that, qua normative practice, practical justification -the basic idea shaping the notion of a practical reason -has a public character. Within the practical domain a justificatory process does not come to an end when it shows that an action is valued by a specific individual. Justifying a course of conduct requires one to argue that it is acceptable in the light of certain standards that are publicly shared and so can be accepted by anyone who prizes the value that the relevant conduct is functional to: an action is justified as long as it is shown to comply with standards others would also regard as grounded and so is to be acknowledged as worthy of being performed. Insofar as it is located in the normative terrain, accordingly, the justificatory stance cannot be conceptualised without distortion as a stance attached to a particular individual. Quite the contrary, it unavoidably connects with an intersubjective standpoint spanning across, and including, all those who are sensitive to the value of the action one is in the process of justifying. From which it follows that conceptually a practical justification cannot be equated to an essentially personal, intimate, or entirely introspective enterprise. In the practical sphere justifying should, instead, be acknowledged as a necessarily intersubjective practice, namely, a practice consisting in arguing that an action is legitimate in the light of certain shared values.
To rephrase this point, once it is conceived as a normative enterprise, a practical justification has to be regarded as a process consisting in submitting a practical statement to public scrutiny. This is to say that, in order to successfully justify her action, an agent cannot confine herself to showing that she personally inseparable from the recognition that there are common practical standards in relation to which one's conduct is assessed and against which the value of that conduct is measured. In other words, justifications are activities that are externally, and so publicly, scrutinisable and checkable. And, this means both acknowledging and committing oneself to constraints that are partially independent of, and not fully relativized to, the individual agent who embarks on the justificatory process.
These remarks have a direct bearing on the nature of a practical reason and also lend support to the publicity thesis. To appreciate this one only has to reconsider the arguments introduced in this section, where I have argued, in a nutshell, that (a) a practical reason is essentially a consideration that justifies;
(b) justification, in turn, is conceptually inseparable from the notions of normativity and normative standards; (c) normativity has a social structure; and (d) a normative standard is, as a result, constitutively agent-independent and relational. This means that a practical reason, qua essential component of a justificatory process (a process with a normative nature), is likewise public, or relational, in essence. As long as practical reasons partake of a justificatory dimension and play a normative function in relation to action, they should be regarded as essentially public standards, since practical justification is an activity governed and constrained by intersubjectively acknowledged normative standards. The implication of these remarks is that a practical reason is a relational idea: acting on a reason takes place against the background of a community of agents and cannot be accounted for as an entirely private matter. This is, one may notice, the very idea underpinning the publicity thesis as I interpret it. From the conceptual point of view, then, a practical reason, qua justificatory consideration that partakes of the normative dimension, is an essentially interpersonal standard and, to that extent, is public in its essence.
In conclusion, an agent's reasons do not simply apply to and make claims about that particular agent; they also produce effects on others. The fact that something is a reason for someone to act in a certain way is not a private fact, or a personal affair; it necessarily justifies other individuals' undertakings and so it is essentially public in quality. This means that the justificatory force of a practical reason is transferrable across subjects and their courses of conduct, to the effect that no (genuine) reason for action can be equated to an idiosyncratic consideration supporting a particular agent's conduct whilst leaving other subjects completely indifferent. This statement finds support in the view that whereas desires, preferences, inclinations, and interests may only reflect private and personal concerns, a practical reason is by its constitution a public standardand so a standard other subjects cannot, willingly or unwillingly, abstain from acknowledging.
Conclusions
In this essay, I took issue with the view that there is a gap setting apart the follows that the idea of a practical reason, when understood as referring to a sort of private property of a specific actor, is internally inconsistent and selfcontradictory.
The strategy I have used to defend these claims about the publicity of practical reasons has consisted in (a) connecting a reason to the practice of justifying and (b) conceptualising justification as a normative activity. In this way, the claim that normativity is concerned with a necessarily public space -a claim that is paradigmatically defended in Wittgenstein's treatment of normativity -can provide support to the argument that practical reasons, qua considerations with the characteristics of normative standards, require intersubjective exchanges to be established, maintained, modified and extinguished. An agent alone, consequently, does not have the necessary resources to transform a consideration into a reason proper. Practical reasons require a community of agents as a necessary background against which they make sense and are fully intelligible. That is to say, a practical reason is an essentially interpersonal standard, as opposed to a personal concern on which an individual agent acts.
Crucially, the version of the publicity thesis that I have set out to defend in this paper dissolves the alleged gap emerging between the practical reasons an agent has and the practical reasons other agents recognise as valid, whilst at the same time being able to account for the fact that different agents in dissimilar situations may legitimately regard diverse performances as justified (which accommodates the widespread belief that certain reasons on which a given agent acts demand from that agent a specific performance that they do not demand of other agents). When the latter is the case, I have argued, it is not because different agents have different reasons -each of which having a private status and so being not recognisable to other agents. It is rather because different agents, whilst appreciating the existence of a public framework of practical reasons and justifications, are, in consideration of their specific positions and peculiar perspectives, legitimated to act on grounds requiring different courses of
